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Summary 
The appreciation of a life-as-a-whole affects evaluative perceptions of various aspects of life. 
When people get happier, they become more satisfied with their jobs and attainments, they see 
more nice events happen to them and they rise in their own estimation. This appears in an 
analysis of the Australian QOL-panel study, involving 4 interviews over a 7 year period. There is 
no ground to dismiss these effects as rosily unrealistic, but there are good reasons to consider 
them beneficial for the individual and the society. 
 
 
The problem 
 
Correlational research has shown strong links between the appreciation of life-as-a-whole and 
evaluative appraisals of various aspects of life. The happy are typically more satisfied with their 
work, their house and the weather. They report better health, think themselves more clever and 
feel themselves more able to handle whatever tasks (see Veenhoven, 1984: ch. 7 for a review). In 
fact, these correlations are among the strongest found in empirical happiness research. 
 Opinions differ on the reasons for these correlations. The dominant view is that aspect 
appreciations determine the overall evaluation of life. This is the so-called `bottom-up' theory 
that presumes people to assess their happiness by counting their sorrows and blessing. The other 
view is that the overall appreciation of life affects the appraisal of its details. This is called `top-
down' theory. For more detail about the bottom-up vs top-down controversy, see Diener (1984). 
 The possibility of top-down effects, while recognized, has scarcely been investigated in 
social scientific research. Yet the theory figured already in earlier philosophical writings on 
happiness. In that literature, different ideas were brought forward as to the benefits of these 
effects. One idea was that these effects are at best a mixed blessing, because they involve reality 
distortion. The happy would fall victim to a rosy view, which blinds them to personal problems 
and social injustice. The other view is that happiness boosts morale and thereby really helps to 
cope with such problems. 
 The purpose of this chapter is first of all to establish whether any top-down effects are 
involved in the relationship between happiness and life-aspect appraisal. A second goal is to 
explore the benefits of these effects. 
 
 
The causal model 
 
Our usual concept of causation requires that in order to say that A causes B we have to show: 
1. that A and B are correlated; 
2. that the correlation is not spurious; 
3. that A precedes B in time (changes in A precede changes in B). 
The biggest difficulty we face in happiness research relates to the third condition. How can we 
possibly know, for example, whether changes in marriage satisfaction or job satisfaction precede 
or follow changes in happiness? The usual answer has been that we can never tell - that these are 
hopelessly confounded chicken-and-egg issues that we will never be able to resolve. There is no 
point in asking which came first, the chicken or the egg. 
 Contrary to this viewpoint we propose a statistical model which, we believe, does give 
some answers. The model works best if four waves of panel data are available. It works 
satisfactorily with three waves ... and, in some circumstances, it can be made to work with two 
waves. Our analysis draws heavily on the statistical work of Kessler and Greenberg (1981) who 
proposed the following model for three waves of data (Scheme 1, page 108). The example we use 
relates to linkages between marriage satisfaction and life satisfaction. 
 Notice that the model includes both cross-lagged and contemporaneous causation 
between MS and LS. The cross-lagged causal links are in accordance with our usual 
understanding of causation in which causes must precede effects. If, for example, marriage 
satisfaction has greater effects on life satisfaction than vice-versa, we would expect that 
MS1   LS2 > LS1   MS2. The notion of contemporaneous or simultaneous causation is more 
problematic, because it defies the time sequence requirement. However, statisticians, especially 
econometricians, often include simultaneous causation in their models in situations where time 
sequence cannot, in practice, be determined, but where causal lags can be assumed to be shorter 
than the interval between observations (e.g. between surveys). 
 Now some mathematical and statistical difficulties. The usual problem with models 
which include two-way causation is that some equations are not identified (i.e. there are too 
many unknowns and too few bits of information). However, as Kessler and Greenberg (1981) 
demonstrate, their 3-wave model is identified if one includes the two equality constraints shown 
in Scheme 1.i
 
 
 Unfortunately there is another difficulty. Although the model is in principle identified, 
one is likely to find that, in actually estimating equations, one runs into problems of 
multicollinearity. In particular, estimates of a and a1 and of b and b1 are likely to be too highly 
correlated to be reliable.ii So in practice one is forced to drop from the model either the cross-
lagged links between marriage satisfaction and life satisfaction or the contemporaneous, 
reciprocal links. In practice the contemporaneous correlations in the data are a fair bit higher than 
the lagged correlations, so it makes more sense to drop the lagged links and to assume that the 
actual time lags are zero (i.e. simultaneous/instantaneous causation).iii
 The general model used to obtain most results in this paper is shown in Scheme 2. 
 
 
 Several theoretical and technical points need to be made about this model. Five separate 
sets of equalities have been imposed. They reflect a theory that the `true' relationships in the 
structural (causal) model should be the same in all four waves of data. Technically the effect of 
the equalities is to assist with identification problems and to provide extra degrees of freedom in 
arriving at maximum likelihood estimates (see below). The inclusion of five exogenous variables 
(sex, age, socioeconomic status, extraversion and neuroticism) also helps with identification. 
These variables are assumed to be causes not consequences of happiness and, being measured at 
the first wave, they are assumed to relate directly to marriage and life satisfaction only at time 1. 
Their relationship to later measures of marriage and life satisfaction is only indirect and they 
therefore serve as instrumental variables helping to identify equations (Kessler & Greenberg, 
1981; Kohn & Schooler, 1983). A third feature of the model is the correlated error terms 
(labelled = 5). Estimates for these error terms reflect the impact of omitted variables which 
Bruce Heady, Ruut Veenhoven 2 Does Happiness induce a rosy outlook?
jointly affect both marriage and life satisfaction. In other words these terms enable us to reduce 
the danger of describing as causal, influences which are merely spurious. 
 
 
The measurement model 
 
Whenever the same variables are repeatedly measured, there is a risk of misestimating (usually 
overestimating) relationships due to autocorrelation. Errors of measurement made on one 
occasion are repeated on later occasions. Provided there are at least two indicators for each 
concept (each factor), autocorrelated error can be estimated with three or more waves of panel 
data. Scheme 3 shows the measurement model which accompanies the structural (causal) model of 
Scheme 2. Equalities have been imposed in all situations where the same factor is measured on the 
same survey scale.iv
 It should be noted that autocorrelated error is significant in the models and has non-trivial 
effects on the causal results of chief interest. In such models it is essential to have multiple 
indicators, since otherwise no estimation of autocorrelation is possible. 
 
  
LISREL 
 
The ideal software for estimating models of this kind is LISREL (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1978).v 
LISREL first estimates a measurement model in order to calculate disattenuated (estimated 
`true') correlations among the factors in the structural or causal model. It then uses these 
correlations to calculate the coefficients in the causal model (maximum likelihood estimates). 
 LISREL has the flexibility to perform the complicated tasks needed to estimate our 
model. It can accept equality constraints, it can estimate correlations among error terms in the 
structural model and it can estimate autocorrelated error in the measurement model. 
 
 
Data 
 
The Australian quality of life panel study 
 
Data to estimate the models come from four waves of the Australian Quality of Life Panel Study 
(1981, 1983, 1985, 1987). The panel study is conducted in Australia's most densely populated 
state, Victoria. A stratified probability sample of 942 persons was drawn in 1981. Panel members 
have been interviewed on three subsequent occasions. By 1987 649 respondents remained. 
House movers are usually traced (over 350 respondents moved between 1981 and 1987) but, 
inevitably, panel loss is fairly substantial. Checks have shown that the means and standard 
deviations of all variables (except age) have remained virtually unchanged over the four waves. 
It is hoped that the study will continue for a decade until 1991. 
 
 
Measures 
 
The main measures referred to in this chapter, collected at each interview are: 
 
Life satisfaction  
Life satisfaction was measured by Andrews and Withey's (1976) Life-as-a-whole index. This 
was obtained by twice asking respondents `How do you feel about your life-as-a-whole?' The 
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two items were approximately twenty minutes apart on the interview schedule. The response 
scale was a 9-point Delighted-Terrible scale, expanded from Andrews and Withey's 7-points to 
reduce bunching at the top end. 
 The Life-as-a-whole Index is considered one of the most reliable and solid measures of 
cognitive life satisfaction (Diener, 1984; Veenhoven, 1984). The two items were included as 
separate indicators in our measurement models (see above). 
 
Domain satisfaction 
Levels of satisfaction with the domains of marriage, work, standard of living, friendship and 
health were measured on a 9-point Delighted-Terrible scale. For all domains multiple items were 
used to enhance reliability. For inclusion in measurement models the items measuring each 
domain were combined into two equal sub-sets. This had the effect of producing two adequately 
reliable indicators, whereas inclusion of all items separately would have meant that some 
indicators had low reliability. 
 
Personality 
The Eysenck Personality Inventory, Form B (Eysenck & Eysenck 1964) measures `extraversion' 
and `neuroticism'. Also included the `lie-scale'. 
 
Socioeconomic status 
Index of 1) gross family income; 2) the occupational status of the main breadwinner, and 3) the 
formal educational level of the respondent.  
 
 
Effects of happiness 
 
We consider the effects of happiness on the following aspects of life: 1) domain satisfactions, 2) 
perceived gaps between goals and achievements, 3) perceived excellence in role performance 
and 4) perceived favorableness of major life events in the past two years. In each case we 
estimated both the top-down (TD) and bottom-up (BU) effects. The results are as follows: 
 
 
The relationship between domain satisfactions and life satisfaction 
 
Most previous researchers have proposed bottom-up models of the relationships between domain 
satisfactions and life satisfaction. That is, they have assumed (but not demonstrated) that 
marriage satisfaction, job satisfaction, etc. cause life satisfaction and not vice-versa (Andrew & 
Withey, 1976; Campbell et al., 1976; Headey, Holmstrom & Wearing, 1984a, 1985). However, 
Costa & McCrae (1980), noting that domain satisfactions tend to be quite highly intercorrelated, 
hypothesized that they may all be consequences of happiness. The issues are excellently 
reviewed in Diener (1984). 
 
Does MS cause LS, or vice versa, or both? (N = 350)  Scheme 4
 
Satisfaction with marriage 
Let us first consider the links between marriage-satisfaction and life-satisfaction. The model 
indicates two-way causation. Being happily married increased one's life satisfaction (the bottom-
up link, BU = +.18), but it is also true that happy people are more likely to form happy marriages 
... while miserable people form miserable marriages (the top-down link, TD = +.12). 
 Since this is the first set of results presented, a number of technical points need to be 
made; points which also apply to subsequent models. An initial comment is that the model fits 
the observed data very satisfactorily. LISREL models can be evaluated by several measures of 
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fit. For this model Chi-square divided by degrees of freedom was 1.65 (Carmines & McIver, 
1981). Hoelter's (1983) Critical Number (CN) was 229.36 and the mean absolute residual was 
.04. A number of sensitivity analyses indicate that reasonable variations in model specification 
do not affect the basic result that marriage satisfaction influences life satisfaction and vice versa. 
If the correlated error terms are dropped, the betas change to BU = +.25 and TD = +.20. Another 
variation involves replacing the contemporaneous links between MS and LS with cross-lagged 
links (see Scheme 1). Again, results indicate two-way causation, although the betas are smaller, 
reflecting lower observed correlations.vi Also the model fits less well. A final check, available 
with four waves of panel data (Kessler and Greenberg, 1981), is to remove one pair of equality 
constraints between MS and LS and to see if the estimates for the free parameters are 
approximately the same as for the constrained parameters. In fact they are.vii
 
Satisfaction with job and level of living 
A puzzling finding in nearly all previous research is that most people, even those in low status 
and routine jobs, report fairly high levels of job satisfaction and satisfaction with their standard 
of living. The results given by our reciprocal causation model cast light on this puzzle. It appears 
that degrees of satisfaction with work and standard of living are just a spin-off (consequences) of 
life satisfaction and have no causal effect at all. 
 
 Job Satisfaction   BU = -.07ns
      TD = +.19 
 Standard of living satisfaction   BU  = -.06ns
      TD = +.17 
It is well known from much previous research that low status people in Western countries are not 
much less happy than high status people (Veenhoven, 1984). It follows from our model that this 
is the main reason for their not being much less satisfied than other with their work and living 
standards. 
 
Satisfaction with friends and support 
In the case of relationships between life satisfaction and measures of friendship satisfaction and 
social support, results are a little ambiguous. Our usual model indicates that the relationship is 
not statistically significant in either direction. However, if we drop the correlated error terms, the 
indication is that two-way causation operates.viii However, there is no real reason to drop the 
correlated error terms; they are statistically significant. So the tentative conclusion is that 
apparent relationships between life satisfaction and social support are spurious. 
 
Satisfaction with health 
Unfortunately the Australian panel survey included no medical checks on people's health. We 
only have measures of self-reported health and health satisfaction. Application of the usual 
model indicates no significant relationship from self-reported health to life satisfaction or vice 
versa. However, if we remove the correlated error terms (probably incorrectly), then it would 
appear that health affects life satisfaction and vice versa (BU = +.11, TD, TD = +.13). 
 
 
Multiple discrepancies and adaptation theory: the relationship between life satisfaction and 
expectation and aspiration gaps 
 
Psychologists have long believed that life satisfaction is greatly influenced by levels of 
expectation and aspiration. Indeed it is often asserted that life satisfaction-scores reflect the gap 
or discrepancy between assessments of one's current life and one's expectations and aspirations 
for the future. If the gap is large, a person is dissatisfied. If the gap is small, the result is 
satisfaction (Campbell et al., 1976; Diener, 1984). Michalos (1980, 1985) has labelled this 
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`multiple discrepancies theory'. An important extension of this theory, referred to by 
psychologists as `adaptation level theory' (Brickman and Campbell, 1971; Brickman, Coates and 
Janoff-Bulman, 1978), is that levels of happiness tend to be fairly stable over time because, if 
favourable events happen (e.g. getting married, winning a state lottery), people adjust their 
expectations upwards, whereas if adverse events happen (e.g. divorce, unemployment), 
expectations are lowered. Either way, life events are believed to have only a very brief effect on 
happiness because adaptation occurs and the gaps between expectations and aspirations on the 
one hand, and assessments of one's current life on the other, remain about the same. 
 Results from the two-way causation model run completely counter to multiple 
discrepancies theory and adaptation hypotheses. We asked Australian respondents to rate their 
present life, their expectations, aspirations and the life they felt they deserved on a ladder with 
twenty rungs (0 = `the worst possible life you could imagine', 20 = `the best possible life you 
could imagine'). We then calculated gap scores (discrepancies) between the three standards of 
judgment and ratings of one's present life. In the two-way causation model these gap scores were 
related to Andrews and Withey's (1976) life satisfaction index. The results indicate that life 
satisfaction causes the gaps and not vice-versa (TD = +.17, BU = -.06ns).ix In other words happy 
people perceive small gaps. It does not appear to be the case that perceiving small gaps causes 
happiness. Equally to the point, our models of the impact of life events on expectations, 
aspirations and happiness show that life events affect happiness but have no effect in the short 
term (up to two years) on expectations and aspirations (Headey & Wearing, 1989). If these 
results replicate and prove correct they have major adverse implications for multiple 
discrepancies theory and adaptation theory. 
 
 
`Illusions' of superior performance and happiness 
 
There is a growing literature which suggests that far form being accurate `reality testers' happy 
people have illusions about the quality of their own performance and attributes in many areas of 
life (Headey & Wearing, 1988a; Myers, 1980; Ross & Sicoly, 1979; Taylor & Brown, 1988). 
Happy people tend to think that they are very good at things - good marriage partners and 
parents, good friends, good at their work and hobbies and so on. In fact the only people who, it 
seems, accurately perceive their own levels of performance are the depressed (Alloy & 
Abramson, 1979). The result is that the human race conspires to produce the statistical 
impossibility that 90% of us are above average! We have labelled this `the sense of relative 
superiority' (Headey & Wearing, 1988a). 
 Usually, in the research literature, the causal direction is described such that feeling 
superior, or feeling that one's own performance is above average makes one feel happier. 
Illusions have benefits! 
 In the Australian survey we asked panel members to rate their own performance as 
partners, parents, friends and workers on a 7-point scale, where point 1 meant `way below 
average' and point 7 meant `way above average'. Answers were highly correlated so, for 
inclusion in models, we calculated SRS (sense of relative superiority) indices. 
 Results indicate strong two-way causation between SRS and life satisfaction (BU = +.23, 
TD = +.41). In view of previous theory it is interesting that the top-down relationship appears 
stronger than the bottom-up. However, both effects are clearly significant. 
 
 
Life events and happiness 
 
Virtually all researchers have treated life events as causes not consequences of happiness, health 
and psychological distress. However Schroeder and Costa (1984) suggested that life events 
inventories - the instruments we actually use to record events - are such poor measures that all 
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we may be collecting are data which reflect people's personalities, and perhaps their levels of 
happiness, and not accurate records of actual events. Maddi, Bartone and Puccetti (1987) 
attempted to refute this suggestion by showing that, even if analysis is confined only to those 
events which are so salient and so objective that it is hard to believe they could be misreported, 
then one still finds statistically significant links running from life events to happiness. 
 Our model confirms that life events have significant effects on happiness, although we 
agree with Schroeder and Costa that both personality and happiness also affect reports of events. 
In this case the model is rather different from previous models. No contemporaneous effects need 
be estimated because we know the time sequence in which all variables exert their influence. 
 Life events were measured on a standard life events inventory (Henderson et al., 1981). 
Events which had actually happened to panel members were dated, so that time sequences were 
unambiguous. Events were scored by two methods in order to provide dual indicators for 
inclusion in models. First, we scored all favorable-seeming events +1 and all adverse-seeming 
events -1 in order to arrive at aggregate favourable events and adverse events scores. We also 
constructed a net score (favourable events minus adverse events). The second method was based 
on respondents' own ratings of events which had happened to them on a 0-10 scale running from 
`extremely distressing' to `extremely satisfying'. Correlations between scores constructed by the 
unit weighing method and the subjective satisfactiondistress scores were high (in the range 0.70 - 
0.85). 
 In the model (scheme 5), showing the effect of `net' life events on life satisfaction, the 
bottom-up effect (+.22) appeared a little stronger than the top-down effect (+.18). We also ran 
models of relationships between favourable events and positive affect, and between adverse 
events and negative affect. (Previous research has indicated that favourable events are unrelated 
to negative affect and adverse events are unrelated to positive affect: Block & Zautra, 1981; 
Headey, Holmstrom & Wearing, 1984b). For the relationships between favourable events and 
negative affect BU = +.27 and TD = +.05ns. These results confirm that events significantly affect 
happiness and suggest that the effects of happiness on perceptions of events are considerably 
weaker. 
 
Life events and life satisfactiona
 
 
Summary of the causes and consequences of happiness 
 
We now summarize results relating to the causes and consequences of happiness in preparation 
for a discussion of whether happiness is beneficial or harmful. 
    
 
Desirability of the effects of happiness 
 
Having established that happiness does indeed give rise to a more optimistic view of various 
aspects of life, we now come to our second question: the question of whether these effects are to 
be welcomed or to be deplored. As noted in the introductory paragraph, there are two opposing 
views on these effects: one dismisses them as dangerous illusions, whereas the other sees them as 
a boost to morale. 
 The critical view presumes that the effects are perceptual. The positive view of one's life-as-
a-whole is seen to induce an unrealistically optimistic outlook which blinds the individual to 
personal problems and social injustice. This is expected to lead to shortsighted and irresponsible 
living and thereby to harm for the individual and society. Proponents of this gloomy view tend to 
draw on the theory of ego-defense. A current formulation of this view is the idea of `depressive 
realism', which draws on indications that depressives have a more accurate perception of their 
own abilities than non-depressives (see Alloy & Abramson, 1979). 
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 The more optimistic view also tends to a perceptual explanation of the effects, but stresses 
the benefits. A positive outlook on life is seen to save the individual from preoccupations and 
anxieties, thus freeing the way for an open appraisal of reality problems and more effective 
coping. This view draws on notions of `self-fulfilling prophesy' and `positive mental health'. It 
figures in research themes such as `perceived control', `self-esteem' and `dispositional optimism'. 
(See respectively Rotter, 1975; Gergen, 1971 and Schreier & Corver, 1987). 
 
In order to assess whether happiness is harmful or not, we must establish the degree of truth in 
these conflicting speculations. The data at hand do not allow definite statements about these 
secondary effects of happiness. Yet there is ground for some tentative comments. 
 
 
Not merely a matter of illusion 
 
The effects of happiness on aspect-appraisals of life are likely to be perceptual to some extent. 
Various perceptual mechanisms can be involved: `selective focusing' and `reminiscence' at the 
beginning of the perceptual process as well as `dissonance reduction' and `attribution' in later 
phases. Still, more palpable effects of happiness can be involved as well. Happiness may really 
improve things, with the result that otherwise similar perceptions pan out more positively. 
Chapter 1 has enumerated several such possible reality consequences of happiness: `enhanced 
activity', `more open perception', `greater resistance to stress', `better ability to love', etc. In this 
line one could think of the following explanations for the effects observed here. 
 
More effective behavior? 
If happiness really enhances `active involvement' and an `open perception', we can expect 
increases in happiness to be followed by an improved performance in various fields. Seen in this 
light we can interpret the effect of happiness on marital satisfaction as indicating that happiness 
facilitates smoother conjugal contacts: e.g. more genuine interest and better problem solving. 
(These possible effects were discussed in more detail in chapter 6.) In the same vein we can 
imagine that happiness makes one's job more attractive. Though it probably does not add much 
to productivity (see chapter 9), happiness is likely to facilitate contacts with colleagues. 
Likewise, we can interpret smaller goal-achievement-gaps as an indication that happy individuals 
have really achieved more: their self-perception of superiority could be partly the result of real 
excellence and their reports of more favorable and fewer adverse life events the fruit of better 
coping. 
 
More realistic goals? 
It is not implausible that a positive appreciation of life favors realistic goal-setting. Perceptions of 
life-chances are less likely to be twisted by anxieties and there is less reason to resort to distant 
projections of the good life. If so, this would explain the smaller goal-achievement gaps 
following increases in happiness, as well as the greater satisfaction with marriage, job, and the 
standard of living. 
 
Less stress? 
As we have seen in the chapters 1 and 8 there are reasons to believe that there is evidence that 
happiness buffers stress. If so (which is not at all sure), this can also explain the observed effects 
of happiness on domain satisfactions as a reality outcome. If happiness decreases our 
vulnerability to stress, we are less afflicted by a marital row or a conflict on the job. Hence 
increases in happiness tend to decrease the dissatisfaction with an otherwise equal marriage and 
job. 
 
Both perceptual effects and reality effects can be involved. We have no independent proof for 
Bruce Heady, Ruut Veenhoven 8 Does Happiness induce a rosy outlook?
either of them. Yet the data convey the suggestion that the perceptual effects are strongest. The 
findings most likely to be due to reality effects might appear to be reports of `life events' 
following changes in happiness. Many of the events involved were matters of fact (got married, 
lost job, etc.). The greater report of these events is therefore not very likely to be a matter of a 
rosy look only. 
 
 
More positive outlook not necessarily less realistic 
 
Even if we accept the explanation that the effects of happiness are largely perceptual, it does not 
follow that the effects are harmful. On a closer look there is, in fact, little support for the 
underlying assumption of happiness strengthening ego-defensive tendencies. 
 
Report of adverse events not more sensitive than report of beneficial events 
The theory of ego-defense would predict that happiness affects the perception of negative life 
events more than of positive events. Only negative events call for defensive denial. 
Underestimation of negative events is more likely to bring harm in the long run than 
overestimation of positive events. 
 Therefore we ran an analysis for favorable and adverse events separately. It appeared that 
the effects of happiness on reports of negative events were no stronger than on reports of adverse 
events. 
 
No higher score on the Lie scale 
If the more positive view following increases in happiness is a matter of reality distortion in the 
first place, it should be revealed in higher scores on the Lie scale. This implies that 1. changes in 
happiness must predict changes in lies scores and 2. that the observed effects of happiness on 
outlook must largely disappear when lie scores are controlled. Both hypotheses were tested and 
found to be false. 
 
Unlikely that happiness shies away from reality 
The claim at stake here is that happiness causes rosy irrealism. This is to say that the more happy 
we become, the more we would be inclined to turn a blind eye to reality problems. Why would 
we? It seems more probable that decreases in happiness rather make us turn away from reality. 
Getting less happy is more threatening than getting more happy. Avoidance of threat is typically 
the reason for reality distortion. In this line Scheier et al. (1986) found optimists to be more 
realistic than pessimists. 
 
 
Broad evidence for positive net effect of a positive outlook 
 
There is extensive literature on the beneficial effects of `positive self-regard', `perceived efficacy' 
and `perceived internal control'. The leading idea is that people do better, the better they estimate 
their chances. If they think they can cope with a problem they tackle it more energetically and 
consistently and hence more successfully. This idea has been confirmed over and over again in 
various empirical studies. Correlational studies have shown optimists to be more successful in 
love and work, to be more resistant to stress, to be more healthy, etc. (i.a. Gergen 1971, Rogers 
1968). Likewise, experimental studies have shown improvement of self-regard and sense of 
control to result in more effective behaviour and better health (i.a. Lietaer & Neirink 1984). This 
is not to say that an optimistic outlook never involves any drawbacks, but rather that its pros 
typically outweigh its cons. 
 With this in mind, let us now take a closer look at the possible harms and benefits of the 
particular effects of happiness at stake here. 
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Greater marriage satisfaction 
If happiness induces a more positive view of one's spouse, this will mostly make the marriage 
more enjoyable for both partners. Thereby the effects of happiness surpass the perceptual level: 
they set in train a self-fulfilling prophesy. It is generally agreed that people flourish better in a 
happy marriage than in an unhappy one: both the spouses themselves as well as their children. 
There is broad empirical evidence for beneficial effects on i.a. performance in school and work, 
on social participation and on mental and physical health. A happy marriage is also beneficial for 
society at large: less alcoholism, less drop-outs and less family payments due to divorce. 
 Only those who are critical of the conservative consequences of the conventional marriage 
and family would deny that happiness is beneficial in this area. 
 
 
Greater job satisfaction 
There is nothing wrong either with happiness favoring a more positive view of one's job. Though 
job satisfaction does not seem to increase productivity (remember chapter 9), it does not harm 
productivity either. Irrespective of productivity, greater job satisfaction is likely to improve 
human relations at work and thereby lower dropping out due to stress and exhaustion. As such, 
greater satisfaction with work is likely to prevent a great deal of misery and to save society a lot 
of money. 
 Still, one could argue that greater job satisfaction makes workers less critical and hence 
social injustice more persistent. Yet, satisfaction with one's job does not imply that one is blind to 
any shortcomings, nor that one is not committed to improvement. As we have seen in chapter 7 
dissatisfaction alone does not predict protest. 
 
Greater satisfaction with standard of living 
Satisfaction with material living standards may well have rather conservative consequences. It 
probably dampens distributional disputes somewhat and one could object that this ends the 
prospects of a fairer distribution of wealth in society. Yet it is also possible that general 
satisfaction with living standards makes it easier for governments to contemplate specific welfare 
policies which have to be paid for by the contented majority of tax payers. 
 Another claim to the detriment could be that greater satisfaction will slow down economic 
growth. In that context we must realize that the satisfied are not without aspirations and there is, 
in fact, no evidence for the theory that economic expansion draws on discontent with he level of 
consumption. 
 
Smaller goal-achievement gaps 
There is no harm either in somewhat more positive estimates of our achievements, even if this 
effect is essentially illusionary. Harm would be involved if happiness did away with all 
aspirations and led us into apathy. However, that is typically not the case. Even the happiest have 
dreams of better times, although the gaps they perceive between their goals and reality are 
smaller. There is no ground either to think that small gaps induce less effort than large gaps. The 
empirical evidence rather indicates that small gaps motivate more than large gaps, probably 
because there is a better chance of success. This fits with the earlier observation that happiness 
stimulates activity rather than dampens it. (See chapter 8). 
 
Enhanced sense of superiority 
Things are less clear in the case of the sense of relative superiority. If happiness strengthens the 
tendency to unrealistic comparison with the average citizen, one can expect harmful 
consequences. Myers (1980) indeed reports that inflated ideas about their own merits lead 
corporate executives and university presidents into overplaying their hands, with damaging 
consequences for their organization and their own careers. Yet the literature on self-respect and 
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locus of control leaves no doubt that there are various positive consequences as well. There is 
certainly no evidence that the harm outweighs the benefits. 
 
Better awareness of positive life events 
Finally consider the effects of happiness on the perception of life events. As we have seen, this a 
matter of both less perceptions of adverse events, and in more perception of positive events. 
There is no harm in that either, at least not as far as common humanistic values are concerned. 
One can only condemn these effects if one favors suffering and rejects happiness anyway. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The appreciation of life-as-a-whole does affect views on various aspects of life. When people get 
happier, they become more positive about themselves, their achievements, jobs, marriages and 
standard of living. They even see more nice events happening to them. It is as yet unclear to what 
extent those effects are just a matter of perception. Even if the effects are largely perceptual, they 
cannot be dismissed as damaging illusions. There seems to be little harm in a positive outlook on 
life and lots of benefits. 
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Notes 
  1  If more equality constraints are imposed, then overidentified equations may result. This is 
highly desirable for estimation purposes. 
  2  This occurs whenever the model is nearly in equilibrium (i.e. when correlations among 
variables in successive waves of data are approximately the same). The effect is the same as 
under-identification; successive waves are not supplying much new information. 
    3  An alternative and technically more correct procedure would be to say that there are single 
but unknown time lags for the effects of MS on LS and LS on MS. The `true' estimates of the 
strength of these effects must lie within the range given by the cross-lagged and the contempora-
neous estimates. N.B.reduced  of the cross-lagged and contemporaneous equations yields 
unbiased estimates (Ronald C. Kessler, personal communication). 
    4  Life satisfaction and domain satisfactions were measured on a 9-point delighted-terrible scale 
(Andrews & Withey, 1976; Headey, Holmstrom & Wearing, 1984a). 
   5  LISREL IV (1978) was used. 
    6  For ease of interpretation standardized coefficients have been preferred. In principle this 
carries the danger that differences in the variances of variables could lead to misleading 
inferences. Comparison with the metric coefficients indicates that, in this particular model, and 
other given in the chapter, the standardized coefficients are not misleading. 
    7  The estimates are 0.14 and 0.15 respectively. 
    8  BU = .14, TD = .18. 
    9  ns = not significant at the 5% level. 
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SCHEME 6 
Causes and consequences of happiness: a summary 
 
 
  Causes Consequences 
 
 
 Domains 
 Marriage Yes Yes 
 Job No Yes 
 Living standard No Yes 
 Friends and social support No No 
 Health No No 
 Expectations and `gaps' 
 Expectations gap No Yes 
 Aspirations gap No Yes 
 Deserve gap No Yes 
 Perceptions, illusions 
 Superior performance as 
 partner, parent, worker, etc. Yes Yes 
 Life events 
 Favourable events Yes Yes 
 Adverse events Yes (?) 
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